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Abstract 
With the shift of U.S. strategic focus to great power competition, interest in industrial 
mobilization for a long-duration, high-intensity conflict has returned. However, the highly 
consolidated and fragile U.S. defense industrial base is not designed to meet this challenge.  
To gain insight into the ability of the defense industrial base to meet the demands of great 
power conflict, the project analyzed the time needed to replace weapon systems’ inventory at 
peacetime and surge production rates. The project found that to replace Major Defense 
Acquisition Program (MDAP) inventories at surge production rates would take an average of 
8.7 years. Some investment categories are at more risk than others, with Navy shipbuilding 
being uniquely challenged. Programs with analogs in the civilian economy appear to have 
faster replacement rates than military unique systems. Finally, the industrial base has 
become more brittle over time in that that it would take longer to replace inventories at Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2020 production rates than at FY1999 production rates. These findings indicate 
that existing surge capacities for major defense acquisition programs fall short of what will be 
needed for a long-duration great power conflict. More research is needed to provide decision-
makers with options to cope with this shortfall. 
Introduction: Why Conduct Research on Industrial Mobilization Now? 
Industrial mobilization was a concern during the Cold War but disappeared during 
the post–Cold War period of short, limited regional conflicts. After a generation of absence, it 
has now returned. The 2017 National Security Strategy criticized the notion that “all wars 
would be fought and won quickly, from stand-off distances and with minimal casualties.” The 
2018 National Defense Strategy highlighted the “reemergence of long-term strategic 
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competition” against “revisionist powers,” identified as Russia and China. In 2017 General 
Dunford, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed concern that an “increasingly 
brittle industrial base” might not sustain a protracted conflict (Nomination, 2017). Many 
observers—from the Commission on the Future of the Army, to academics and think tanks, 
to the Defense Science Board—have also warned about the renewed risk of long, high-
intensity wars. Wars against great powers burn up weapons and munitions at a ferocious 
rate, far beyond what the United States has experienced in recent regional conflicts. 
However, the highly consolidated and fragile U.S. defense industrial base is not 
designed to meet this challenge. After the Cold War, the demand for weapons declined, the 
need for surge capability disappeared, and the industrial base was under tremendous 
pressure to reduce cost. As a result, industry consolidated so that there were fewer 
producers in any weapons area. Programs were designed for peacetime efficiency, not 
mass wartime production, because maintaining unused capacity for mobilization is 
expensive. This focus on efficiency produces “brittleness” (to use Gen Dunford’s term), that 
is, an acquisition system that is well-designed for a particular set of circumstances but liable 
to failure in other circumstances. 
When strategists and planners think of industrial mobilization, they think of World 
War II and all that came with it: conversion of civilian industry to military use, mass 
production, a long buildup of forces, and finally, well equipped, massive armies that 
overwhelm opponents. However, future wars are unlikely to have the long strategic warning 
that the United States had before World War II. Existing industrial mobilization capabilities 
are all that will likely be available.  
This new strategic environment—of great power conflict, potentially long wars with 
high attrition, a consolidated defense industry, and the lack of strategic warning—drives a 
need to conduct research on the industrial base’s ability to cope with attrition and the 
demands of high-intensity great power conflict. 
Research Questions 
To gain insight into the industrial base’s ability to cope with great power conflict, the 
project developed four research questions. 
What is the ability of existing and surge production capabilities to replace 
current inventories in the event of a prolonged great power conflict? 
This provides the basic analysis of the defense industrial base. Existing production 
rates need to be rapid enough to replace inventories on a peacetime schedule. Surge 
production rates indicate how well the industrial base would support wartime operations. 
Slow replacement at surge rate indicates a potential wartime problem. The difference 
between the two rates shows how much the industrial base can surge. 
Has the industrial base become more brittle—that is, less able to replace 
inventory—over time? 
This question investigates the concern that Gen Dunford raised about whether the 
industrial base is becoming more brittle. There are reasons to believe that might be true, but 
it is unproven. If the industrial base is indeed becoming more brittle, then the challenge of 
sustaining U.S. forces in a prolonged great power conflict is becoming more severe. 
Are some industries or categories of weapons at greater risk than others? 
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The DoD acquires weapon systems from many different industries, each with its own 
capabilities and dynamics. These differences may result in different surge rates, different 
lengths of time to replace inventory, and, hence, different levels of risk 
Are systems with civilian analogs at less risk? 
Military systems with civilian analogs, that is, where the civilian economy produces 
something similar, might have higher surge rates and lower time to replace because civilian 
capacity could be adapted to military use. The answer is important because the DoD might 
need to rely more on such systems in a conflict where custom-designed military systems 
attrite faster than the industrial base can replace them. 
Literature Review 
Industrial mobilization has a long history in the United States, and the literature on 
that history and on the defense industrial base itself can illuminate challenges currently 
facing the DoD. 
World War I. For 50 years after the Civil War, the United States fought frontier 
skirmishes and limited regional wars like the Spanish–American War. Thus, the United 
States was ill-equipped in 1917 for the massive undertaking of fighting a great power 
conflict. Recognizing the challenge, the president and Congress created the Council of 
National Defense and War Industries Board to coordinate the materiel and labor demands of 
industrialized warfare (Neumann, 2017). However, rapid military expansion, outdated 
equipment designs, and a lack of trained personnel forced the United States to rely heavily 
on its allies to equip its forces until the last few months of the war. For some armaments, like 
tanks, the United States never fielded its own equipment in time. 
The Interwar Period. Because of the industrial challenges the United States faced 
during World War I, attempts at planning for a potential future war began in the early 1920s. 
Although considerable effort was made, few tangible steps were taken to address the 
challenges of mass mobilization (Koistinen, 1979). Instead, American isolationism, 
disillusionment about the cost of war, and economic depression prevented serious 
preparations for any future conflict. 
World War II. It wasn’t until after the Munich Agreement in September 1938 and a 
grim assessment of French air combat capacity that the mood in Washington began to shift 
from neutrality and isolation to engagement. Overseas weapons orders and a naval buildup 
drove the first phase of industrial mobilization. The second phase of mobilization began in 
May 1940, when the “phony war” ended, and German forces advanced through Belgium, 
Holland, Luxembourg, and France. This phase entailed a peacetime draft, mobilization of 
reserves, and ordering of equipment to support a vastly expanded army. The Office of 
Production Management, its successor, the War Production Board, and a variety of 
subordinate agencies were established to coordinate industry, raw materials, and labor 
(Herman, 2012). 
The third and final phase began after the attack on Pearl Harbor when it became 
clear that the United States needed enough military-industrial capacity to fight in two 
theaters. In addition to the earlier reliance on the government-owned, contractor-operated 
armament plants, conversion of manufacturing from civilian to military production was now 
required. Thus, hundreds of firms and plants that had not participated in the first two stages 
of the mobilization effort were folded into the war economy (Wilson, 2016). The results were 
nothing short of astonishing. Unlike in World War I, where the United States relied on its 
allies for equipment, in World War II, the United States supplied not only its own forces but 
also those of its allies. However, it took five years from the beginning of industrial expansion 
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in 1938 before U.S. forces could face the Wehrmacht and Imperial Japanese forces on an 
equal footing. 
The Cold War. Although the Cold War period saw the United States fight multiple 
limited conflicts, these never required industry to mobilize in the same manner it had for the 
two world wars. However, large defense budgets after 1950 allowed the U.S. defense 
industry to maintain a high level of readiness. The Defense Production Act, passed in 1950 
in response to the Korean War mobilization, gave the president the means to prioritize 
national security production and allocate resources in an emergency and substituted for the 
government planning agencies of the world wars.   
Post–Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, the need for industrial mobilization 
faded, and the defense budget declined by 40%. The defense industry was encouraged to 
merge and consolidate into a lean, efficient set of firms that could survive in the post–Cold 
War environment. Thus, 15 firms consolidated into four. With the return of great power 
competition with Russia and China, interest in high-intensity, long-duration conflicts revived. 
However, the literature on the industrial base still focuses primarily on peacetime efficiency 
and sustainability. 
Methodology 
To gain insight into the ability of the defense industrial base to meet the demands of 
great power conflict, the project analyzed how long it would take to replace the current 
inventory of weapon systems using a peacetime production rate and a wartime surge rate. 
To conduct this analysis, this project developed a comprehensive database of DoD 
production data for FY2020 and FY1999, drawing on DoD budget and acquisition 
documents.  
Data Sources  
Service Budget Exhibits P-40s and P-21s. The P-40 exhibits contain summary 
data on procurement program cost and quantity for the budget year, two prior years, and the 
next four years. Occasionally total, prior year, and future year data are also included 
because they can be useful to determine total inventory. The P-21 exhibits contain detailed 
system information on cost, quantity, surge production rates, production lead times, and 
deliveries.  
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs). SARs contain inventory data as well as 
information on acquisition strategy and contract types. Although not all SARs are publicly 
available in their full form, CSIS has access to an extensive portfolio in the budget year and 
prior years. Because SARs are statutorily required reports to Congress, the project used 
SAR data whenever inconsistencies arose.  
Service Inventory Data. Each of the services publishes inventory data for major 
weapons systems. The Navy, for example, has data on current ship inventories, updated 
weekly, and historical data going back to the early 20th century. The Air Force annually 
publishes data on all aircraft inventories. 
Production Rates. The P-21 budget documents provide data for three kinds of 
production rates: minimum sustaining rate (MSR), “1-8-5”, and “MAX.”  
The Minimum Sustaining Rate. The comptroller’s guidance defines this as the “rate 
that is necessary to keep production lines open while maintaining a base of responsive 
vendors and suppliers; the quantity that will preclude start-up costs in the case of a 
production break; or the quantity that the contractor is willing to accept and produce at a 
reasonable cost” (DoD, 2017, p. 4-48). This rate is important in budget and acquisition 
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analyses when the military services want to keep the production line going but lack the 
resources. Because the project was analyzing industrial mobilization—increases in 
production—it did not use this rate.  
“1-8-5,” Also Called the Economical Production Rate. The comptroller’s guidance 
defines this as “the most efficient production rate for each budget year at which the item can 
be produced with existing or planned plant capacity and tooling, with 1 shift a day running 
for 8 hours a day and 5 days a week (1-8-5)” (DoD, 2017, p. 4-48). 
“MAX,” the Maximum or Surge Production Rate. The comptroller’s guidance defines 
this as “the maximum capacity rate that a contractor can produce with extant or PY planned 
tooling” (DoD, 2017, p. 4-48). This represents the surge production rate that is achievable 
with current facilities. Sometimes this represents moving from one shift a day to three shifts, 
but often there is a facility constraint that prevents such a tripling of output. The fiscal 
assumption is that sufficient funds would be available in any crisis that merited surge 
production. Given congressional and presidential support for DoD budgets in recent 
conflicts/crises, such as Desert Storm, the invasion of Iraq, and the pandemic, this 
assumption appears to be reasonable. 
Navy Shipbuilding, a Special Case. The Navy does not publish production rates for 
ships because of their unique circumstances: high cost and low rates of production. In its 
FY2019 and FY2020 long-range shipbuilding plans, however, the Navy produced a table 
that showed planned production for each ship type and potential increases in production. 
The project used this table as a statement of surge capability in the shipbuilding industrial 
base. 
Data Quality. A brief note is necessary regarding the data’s quality. The service 
procurement justification books, particularly the P-21 budget exhibits, contained many errors 
and anomalies, and therefore the data needed to be examined carefully. An illustrative 
example was an Army trailer program that reported rates of MSR, 1-8-5, and MAX of 
20/20/80. It seems impossible that the maximum rate was four times the 1-8-5 rate since 
there are only 24 hours (3 shifts) in a day. Although the budget preparation guidance directs 
that the number of shifts be specified, few program offices did that, so it was hard to judge 
the validity of some surge data. Other program offices appear to triple the 1-8-5 rate to come 
up with a surge rate without any indication of whether existing facilities would allow such an 
increase. Program offices sometimes input monthly data when the exhibit called for annual 
data, especially in the FY1999 P-21s. There was also confusion about whether the 
quantities shown were actual or in thousands, although the budget preparation guidance 
directed that this be specified. Problems were also found in the 2020 data, though less 
commonly. 
For example, one program that procured large satellites reported a monthly 
production rate of one for MSR, two for 1-8-5, four for surge/MAX. This implied a MAX 
annual rate of 48, far beyond any likely capability. In this case, the project contacted the 
program office, which acknowledged that the data were, in fact, annual. The official in 
charge of inputting the data said that the exhibit preparation menus were confusing. 
Confusion is not surprising, given that the data are entered by dozens of individual program 
offices, each operating independently and with varying degrees of expertise.  
The project identified anomalies—generally data that looked too high or too low in 
comparison with data in other exhibits or other documents, like SARs—and corrected those 
that it could. Others that were anomalous—generally because their surge/MAX rate was too 
high or their inventory objective was off—were tagged as such and excluded from the initial 
analysis.  
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The Industrial Mobilization Database 
Using data from the budget justification books and the SARs, the project put together 
an industrial mobilization database. This consists of current production rates, surge 
production rates, and total inventories for a wide variety of weapon systems—land, sea, air, 
C4I, space, munitions—at two points in time, FY2020 and FY1999. Total inventory data was 
derived from the P-40 procurement quantities in past and future years or from the SARs 
when available. Production data for each weapon system manufacturer was recorded from 
the P-21s and aggregated to provide a single 1-8-5 and MAX rate for each system. For each 
system, the database also contained information on industry category, production lead time, 
military service, and budget line numbers. 
FY1999 was chosen for two reasons: first, it is the earliest year for which data are 
readily available in electronic form on the DoD comptroller’s website. Second, that year 
gives a view of capabilities before the post–9/11 buildup and resulting wartime production 
surge.  
FY2020 was chosen because it was the most recent set of data available when the 
project began its work last fall. (FY2021 data has since become available, but from an initial 
analysis, it is not materially different from the FY2020 data.)  
Two additional years will also be analyzed in the future: FY2008, which represents 
the height of the wartime surge, and FY1989, the end of the Cold War, to see whether the 
industrial base of the Cold War was different. (Obtaining data from FY1989 will depend on 
the reopening of the federal archives, which are currently closed.) 
Calculations 
For each system, the project calculated the time needed to replace the inventory. As 
a baseline, the project used time to replace inventory at the current (“peacetime”) production 
rate. The analysis used the 1-8-5 rate for the current (“peacetime”) production rate. This was 
better than the production rate in any particular budget year, which jumped around year to 
year based on the vagaries of the political and budgeting process and thus did not provide a 
stable baseline. 
Inventory replacement at peacetime production rate is as follows: 
 
The key calculation was the ability of the industrial base to replace inventories under 
surge conditions. The calculation for surge evolved as the project refined its analysis. 
Inventory replacement at surge rate (in years) is as follows: 
 
The calculation divided the inventory objective by the MAX production rate, 
measured in years. 
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Inventory replacement at surge rate with production lead time is as follows:  
 
This initial calculation, however, did not allow for the time that production facilities 
needed to expand from the “peacetime” production rates to surge production rates, since no 
system operated at the surge rate. Available data do not specify a lead time to reach surge 
rate. As a surrogate, the second calculation added the lead time (called “reorder production 
leadtime”) cited in the budget justification books for any production increase. This time 
varied from two months to four years. Because this time interval covered any production 
increase, it was not the same as the lead time to surge rate, which would likely be longer 
because surge rates are typically higher than amounts envisioned by the reorder rate. 
Nevertheless, this was a rough approximation, and including some lead time was important 
because whatever the actual lead time to surge rate was, it was not zero. 
Inventory replacement at adjusted surge rate is as follows:  
 
The final calculation, and the one used for calculations in the report, is the surge rate 
with production lead time and inventory adjustments. This added another adjustment to 
account for the fact that during the time between peacetime production and surge 
production, systems would be produced and would, therefore, reduce the amount of 
inventory that needed to be produced at the surge rate. Thus, the final calculation was as 
follows: 
Reorder Production Leadtime multiplied by Aggregated 1-8-5 Years, subtracted from 
Inventory Objective and all divided by the Aggregated MAX Years plus Reorder Product 
Leadtime. 
For example, the total Apache inventory objective is 639 (all models), peacetime (1-
8-5) production rate is 98 per year, maximum production rate is 144 per year, reorder 
product lead time is one year. Therefore, the time to replace the inventory is 6.5 years at the 
1-8-5 production rate, 4.44 years at the surge rate, 5.44 years at the surge rate with lead 
time, and 4.76 years at the surge rate with lead-time and inventory adjustment. 
Major and Nonmajor Acquisition Programs. This project pays particular attention 
to the production rates of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), because these are 
the largest and most important programs. At any one time, they constitute about half of all 
procurement funding (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense [Comptroller], 2020). MDAPs 
are designated by statute as programs with a research, development, and test and 
evaluation requirement of more than $480 million in FY2014 constant dollars, a procurement 
requirement of more than $2.79 billion in FY2014 constant dollars, or having been 
designated a special interest program by the secretary of defense (DoD, 2015). The project 
identified MDAPs using the SAR summary tables for the relevant budget year.  
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Not all MDAPs were suitable for surge analysis because of data limitations. For 
2020, there are 87 total MDAPs reported in the updated SAR summary tables (DoD, 2019). 
Of these, two MDAPS share the same production lines (Apache New Build and 
Remanufacture; and the KC-130J and C-130s), leaving 85 separate MDAPs. Because the 
P-21 exhibits do not provide production data for Navy ships (the project did this analysis 
separately), this is further reduced by the 10 Navy ships to 75 total MDAPs. Of the 
remaining 75 programs, only 45 had production rates in the P-21 exhibits. Among these, a 
further 10 were considered anomalous, generally because their surge/MAX rate was 
unrealistically high, or their inventory objective was inaccurate when compared to other 
information. A breakdown can be seen in Table 1. The project is working to clarify the data 
on these systems.  
Table 1. 2020 MDAP Breakdown 
 
Nonmajor programs analyzed in this study are all those programs that do not meet 
the threshold for MDAPs but still have inventory and surge production data in the P-21 
exhibits of the budget justification books. Programs with cost elements of more than $5 
million in the budget year are required to submit a P-21 (DoD, 2017, p. 4-48). 
Question 1: What Is the Ability of Existing Production Capabilities to Replace 
Current Inventories in the Event of a Prolonged Great Power Conflict?  
Figure 1 shows the time required to replace MDAP inventories at the “peacetime” 
production rate, defined as the 1-8-5 rate.  
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Figure 1. Time to Replace 2020 MDAP Inventories at 1-8-5 Rate 
Table 2 shows the data from Figure 1 smoothed to a curve. These charts provide a 
baseline against which to compare surge production. The times appear to be reasonable for 
a peacetime, non-surge environment. Systems have useful lives of many years, decades in 
most cases. The replacement times allow the military services enough time to replace old 
systems with new systems. For example, the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter has a 20-year 
lifetime, according to the SAR. The inventory is 639 aircraft, and the 1-8-5 production rate is 
98 per year. Thus, it would take 6.5 years to replace the inventory. This is enough time to 
get the new aircraft into the field and have an adequate service life before a new system 
replaces it. 
Table 2. Time to Replace MDAPs at 1-8-5 Rate, Mean and Median  
Mean Median  
14.433 10.300 
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Question 2: What Is the Ability of Surge Production Capabilities to Replace 
Current Inventories in the Event of a Prolonged Great Power Conflict?  
Not surprisingly, increasing production to the surge rate reduces the amount of time 
needed to replace inventories. However, the effect is not as large as might be expected. 
Even at surge production rates, replacement times still range out to 30 years, as can be 
seen in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. Time to Replace 2020 MDAP Inventories at Adjusted Surge Rate 
Mean replacement time declines from 14.4 years to 8.7 years, with the median from 
10.3 years to 7.5 years (see Table 3). In theory, moving from 1-8-5 and one shift per day to 
MAX/surge and potentially three shifts a day should triple production and, therefore, cut 
replacement time by a third. This does not happen because constraints on facilities and 
tooling put limits on how much production can increase in many programs. 
Table 3. Time to Replace MDAPs at Adjusted Surge Rate, Mean and Median  
Mean Median  
8.711 7.480 
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Question 3: Has the Industrial Base Become More Brittle Over Time? 
Figure 3 overlays the FY1999 time to replace MDAP curve onto the FY2020 curve. 
On average, inventories in FY2020 take longer to replace. 
 
Figure 3. 2020 versus 1999: Time to Replace MDAP Inventories at Adjusted Surge 
Rate  
As shown in Table 4, the mean increases from 6.6 years in FY1999 to 8.7 years in 
FY2020, and the median increases from 4.3 years to 7.5 years. This indicates that the 
defense industrial base is indeed getting more brittle, as Gen Dunford had noted. Although 
the data do not give insight into why this occurs, the literature review indicates that the 
consolidation of the industrial base over time has squeezed out slack in the system that 
might be used for surge. 
Table 4. 2020 versus 1919 Comparison, Mean and Median  
2020 Mean Median  
 8.711 7.480 
1999 Mean Median  
 6.580 4.270 
Question 4: Are Some Industries or Categories of Weapons at Greater Risk 
than Others? 
The DoD acquires weapons of many different types, and each type has a different 
dynamic. This analysis allocates systems into the investment categories that the DoD uses 
in its SARs and its annual report Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System 
(Comptroller, 2020).  
The curves for the different investment categories in Figure 4 show significant 
differences. 
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Legend: Aircraft and Related Systems (ARS), C4I Systems (C4I), Ground Systems (GS), 
Missiles & Munitions (MM), Mission Support Activities (MSA), Space Based Systems (SBS). 
Figure 4. Time to Replace Inventories by Investment Type at Adjusted Surge Rate  
Mission support activities and C4I systems have shorter replacement times, possibly 
because they have analogs in the civilian economy. Space systems have long replacement 
times because satellites are not built on assembly lines but instead individually fabricated. 
That inhibits surge production. Also, production rates are low because satellites can last a 
long time once in orbit. The data are summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5. Investment Type Comparisons, Mean and Median  
ARS Mean Median  
 6.475 4.760 
C4I Mean Median  
 4.84 2.37 
GS Mean Median  
 5.683 3.930 
MM Mean Median  
 6.864 6.165 
MSA Mean Median  
 2.254 2.000 
SBS Mean Median  
 7 7 
Analysis of Ships 
Calculating how long it would take to replace the Navy’s battle force ship inventory is 
difficult. The principal reason is that, unlike for other MDAPs, P-21 budget exhibits do not 
provide production rate data for ships. This is likely due to their unique procurement profiles. 
Ships are built one by one, not on assembly lines. Thus, estimating surge rates requires an 
assessment of the shipbuilders’ production capacity across an entire yard, which entails 
more analysis than most program offices can do. 
However, the project did develop a methodology to give an approximate answer how 
long it would take to replace the current ship inventory. That methodology is similar to the 
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methodology used for other MDAPs but used the data that are available on shipbuilding—
current inventory, current production rates, ship delivery times, and a Navy analysis of 
shipbuilding capacity. Data for current inventory and current production rate came from the 
Navy FY2021 Budget Highlights book (DoD, 2020, pp. 3-2, 4-3). Table 6 below shows the 
result of this analysis.  
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11.25 
Current production rate was the total number of ships planned for procurement over 
the five-year period FY2021 to FY2025 (FYDP), divided by five to smooth out the rate for 
any particular budget year. Because the five-year period is fiscally constrained, it provides a 
better peacetime rate than fiscally unconstrained long-term plans. Surge data came from the 
Navy’s 2020 30-year shipbuilding plan, which showed not only planned shipbuilding but also 
additional capacity in the shipbuilding industrial base. This is a relatively new addition that 
arose in response to questions whether the industrial base could build the 355-ship goal that 
the Navy had established. The Navy’s analysis did not show any delay in achieving the 
surge shipbuilding rates, which seems overly optimistic. Nevertheless, the project accepted 
that assumption and did not include a lead time to achieve surge production rate, unlike the 
project’s assumption for other programs. Delivery times came from analysis of the P-27 
exhibit and its production schedules for specific ships. Because delivery times for ships are 
so long, the analysis added that time as part of the total time to replace inventory. 
This analysis is admittedly imperfect. Inventories represent a point in time and not a 
long-term average. Construction of particular classes of ships comes in waves so that even 
a five-year window does not smooth out all of the variation. Finally, over the long periods 
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that would be involved in a surge situation, the Navy would have time to build new capacity 
in existing yards and bring in new yards that are not now building Navy ships.  
Nevertheless, the analysis provides an important insight: The Navy ship inventory 
would take an extremely long time to replace even under surge conditions. Compared with 
the other types of weapon systems, ships have by far the longest replacement period, and 
this presents the Navy with a unique challenge. 
Question 5: Are Systems with Civilian Analogs at Less Risk? 
Figure 5 compares the time to replace inventories for MDAPs versus non-MDAPs. 
The MDAP curve is the same as shown previously. The non-MDAP curve shows data from 
156 smaller programs that had inventory and production rate data in the budget justification 
books. 
 
Figure 5. MDAP versus Non-MDAP Time to Replace Inventories at Adjusted Surge 
Rate  
Smaller programs had dramatically shorter times to replace inventory, as can be 
seen in Table 7. This does not prove that programs with civilian analogs are at less risk. 
Many of the vehicle and communications programs do have civilian analogs, but others are 
uniquely military, despite their small size. However, it does open that possibility since the 
lower cost of the non-MDAP programs would make them accessible to civilian firms. 
Table 7. 2020 MDAP versus Non-MDAP Comparison, Mean and Median  
MDAP Mean Median  
 8.711 7.480 
Non-MDAP Mean Median  
 3.28 2.92 
Wheeled Vehicles: A Surrogate for Systems with Civilian Analogs 
As a test case, the project looked at wheeled vehicles acquired by the DoD to see 
whether systems with civilian analogs had shorter inventory replacement times. Wheeled 
vehicles were chosen because the civilian economy produces many such systems, but there 
are potentially many other systems with civilian analogs. The analysis showed that, indeed, 
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these systems had shorter inventory replacement times than other systems and much 
shorter inventory replacement times than MDAPs (see Figure 6 and Table 8).  
 
Figure 6. Time to Replace Wheeled Vehicles at Adjusted Surge Rate 
Table 8. Wheeled Vehicle vs. Other Programs Comparison, Mean and Median  
Wheeled Vehicles Mean Median  
 3.60 3.54 
Other Programs Mean Median  
 5.649 4.200 
Table 9. Wheeled Vehicles Selected (2020)  
Tactical Trailers/Dolly Sets 
Semitrailers, Flatbed: 
Ambulance, 4 LITTER, 5/4 TON, 4x4 
Ground Mobility Vehicles (GMV) 
Family of Medium Tactical Veh (FMTV)  
Firetrucks & Associated Firefighting Equip 
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Protection Kits 
Family Of Forklifts 
The Real Problem: Weapon System Attrition and Munition Expenditures 
The project used this methodology because the data are available across the wide 
spectrum of systems that the DoD uses. This allowed comparable analyses of many 
systems in different time periods. However, the wartime challenge is not to replace 
inventory. The wartime challenge is to replace losses. These losses manifest as attrition of 
weapon systems mainly due to enemy action and the expenditure of munitions. 
Unfortunately, forecasting attrition in peer conflicts is hard because such conflicts are—
fortunately—rare. Attrition rates must, therefore, be deduced from historical analysis. One of 
the authors previously did an analysis of armored forces that gives a sense of what such 
dynamics might look like: 
In the Yom Kippur war of 1973, the Israelis lost 400 out of 1,700 tanks, a rate 
of about 1.1 percent per day over the 20 days of increasingly lopsided 
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combat. The Arab armies lost far more. The great 1943 tank battle of Kursk 
caused very high tank losses—the Germans lost 14 percent per day over two 
weeks of combat, or 110 percent of their initial force—but that was a short 
engagement of unusual intensity. In World War II, the average U.S. infantry 
battalion on the front line lost 2.6 percent of its personnel per day, even 
without major fighting. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that an intense 
peer conflict would destroy about 1 percent of the tank force every day. That 
includes losses from all sources—combat, abandonment during retreat, sunk 
en route to theater, and accidents. 
With all 15 armored brigades engaged, the U.S. armored force would lose 13 
tanks per day on average or 390 per month. By pulling in replacements from 
the tanks in maintenance and the training base, the armored brigade combat 
teams could stay at full strength for about two months. After that, the force 
would decline steadily: to 74 percent in month four (960 tanks), 55 percent in 
month five (715 tanks), 41 percent in month six (533 tanks), and so on. By 
month 10, the force would be down to 158 tanks—two armored brigades’ 
worth. (Cancian, 2017) 
Such loss rates imply that the industrial base, even surging production, would be 
inadequate.  
Munitions expenditures have a similar challenge but a different dynamic. Munitions 
are stockpiled in peacetime for wartime use, but peacetime inventories are often too small 
for actual wartime expenditures. Again, data are sparse, but it is possible to get glimpses. 
For example, during the Falklands War, the Royal Navy reportedly expended hundreds of 
antisubmarine munitions, depleting its Cold War stocks in a short war against a regional 
power (Argentina; Privratsky, 2016). For a great power conflict today, some analyses 
indicate that certain U.S. munitions would be quickly exhausted (Tol, Gunzinger, 
Krepinevich, & Thomas, 2010). 
Munitions expenditures and the capability of the industrial base to replace them may 
seem to be a technical military problem, but they have a political dimension as well. The 
“shell shortage” that Great Britain experienced in 1915 caused the fall of the Asquith 
government. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The analysis produced by this project shows that the defense industrial base could 
not quickly replace most weapon system inventories. Even at surge production rates, 
replacement would take many years. In peacetime, this is not a problem because the 
military services have many years to build inventories. Structuring the defense industrial 
base for efficient production at expected peacetime rates make sense in an environment 
where resources are always constrained and the cost of weapon systems is under 
continuous scrutiny. Wartime demands in the post–Cold War era were also not a problem 
because the regional conflicts that the United States conducted did not cause enough 
attrition or munitions expenditures to go beyond what the industrial base could produce. 
However, this analysis implies that, in a great power conflict as now envisioned in the 
national defense strategy, these production rates would be inadequate to sustain forces in 
the field for any length of time. Such conflicts do not allow the industrial base the many 
years needed to produce large numbers of replacement systems. 
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The following areas, therefore, deserve additional research to build a sufficient 
corpus of data and analysis that would allow DoD acquisition officials to make informed 
decisions about mitigating industrial base risk. 
1. Identify low-cost ways to relieve bottlenecks. Funding will always be limited 
for surge production, given the pressing demands of near-term acquisition 
and the pressure to remove “slack” in the system. Therefore, the DoD should 
identify bottlenecks on key systems that small investments might mitigate—
for example, addition of a critical machine tool or support for a supplier. This 
analysis should assume that when surge demand is required, the authorities 
of the Defense Production Act will be available, as well as adequate funding. 
Congress and the president will likely provide both in a national emergency 
since they did both readily for Desert Storm in 1991, the Iraq/Afghanistan 
wars of the 2000s, and the recent pandemic. 
2. Ascertain wartime attrition and expenditure rates. As noted, the real demand 
on the defense industrial base in a great power conflict will be from combat 
attrition and munitions expenditures. The DoD should conduct these analyses 
to get a sense of how severe these wartime demands would be. Because of 
the depth of historical research involved, such research would necessarily 
focus on a limited set of weapon systems and munitions. 
3. Develop supplemental acquisition strategies ahead of time. Even with some 
warning and the alleviation of key bottlenecks, the defense industrial base 
may not be able to produce the large amount of equipment that might be 
needed rapidly in a great power conflict. Therefore, the acquisition community 
should investigate supplemental approaches, such as adaptation of civilian 
systems that might be appropriate for military use and acquisition of 
appropriate foreign systems. Such an investigation could, at the least, identify 
the parameters and key considerations in developing alternative acquisition 
strategies. 
The last recommendation is to scrub the production data in the budget justification 
books, particularly the P-21 exhibits. Consistent and accurate data on production are 
essential for providing accurate assessments of the defense industrial base’s capacity to 
respond to emergency conditions, but, as noted earlier, some data are inaccurate. Unlike 
the selected acquisition reports, for example, the budget exhibits relating to production data 
appear to receive little scrutiny. The relevant direction in the DoD’s (2017) Financial 
Management Regulations is clear. It directs, for example, that production rates should be 
“yearly rates,” but many programs report monthly rates. The guidance also requires 
specification of the number of shifts under surge (MAX), but few programs provide that 
information.  
The DoD should, therefore, conduct a review of the production rate data to identify 
anomalies that appear to be out of line with the guidance and then resolve these with the 
relevant program offices. The review should require that programs provide any missing 
production rate data, which is a problem in about 11% of MDAPs. Since the DoD produces 
these exhibits with little change from year to year, that review does not need to be repeated 
for several years. 
The DoD should also direct a modest expansion of the required production rate data 
to include a short explanation of how program offices develop the surge rate, since many 
rates seem to lack any analytic foundation except for being three times the 1-8-5 rate. 
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